A consensus exists among contemporary philosophers of biology about the history of their field. According to the received view, mainstream philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s focused on physics and general epistemology, neglecting analyses of the 'special sciences', including biology.
Beckner ([1959] ) and Marjorie Grene ([1959] ; Grene and Mendelsohn [1976] ) were first, followed by David Hull ([1964 , 1969 , 1974 ), Michael Ruse ([1973] ), Kenneth Schaffner ([1967a , 1967b ), and William Wimsatt ([1972] ). 2 Beckner's Biological Way of Thought ([1959] ) and Hull's Philosophy of Biological Science ([1974] ) were especially influential. By the mid-1980s, a second generation of philosophers of biology ushered the field into a professional subdiscipline. That generation (from, roughly, the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s)
included Ronald Amundson, John Beatty, Robert Brandon, Richard Burian, Lindley Darden, David Depew, John Dupré, James Griesemer, Philip Kitcher, Elisabeth Lloyd, Alexander
Rosenberg, Elliott Sober, and Bruce Weber, among others.
The recent origins of philosophy of biology might suggest that philosophy of biology had been previously neglected by philosophers of science. Why else, one might ask, would philosophers of science have carved out a new professional niche devoted to the analysis of biology? Indeed, the first philosophy of biology textbooks claimed that their subject had been ignored by contemporary philosophers of science in favour of physics. Consider the following, taken from a few introductions:
One often finds philosophers remarking that the account of scientific methods and procedures drawn up by contemporary empiricists suffers from an undue preoccupation with the physical sciences. (Beckner [1959: v] )
The author of a book on the philosophy of biology need offer no excuse for the subject he has chosen, since few areas of philosophy have been so neglected in the past fifty years. (Ruse [1973: 9] )
The purpose of this volume will be to take a closer look at that area of science [biology] which has been passed over in the rapid extrapolation from physics to the social sciences. (Hull [1974: 6] )
The philosophy of biology should move to the center of the philosophy of science-a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across contemporary philosophy of biology as well. (Cohen and Wartofsky [1976: v]) These statements were written by first-generation philosophers of biology. Together, they expressed the view that philosophy of biology had not fared well, at least vis-à-vis philosophy of physics, among philosophers of science at the time. The authors justified their projects as a remedy to that neglect. A similar view can be found in the textbooks published by second-generation philosophers of biology: 3
In the last few decades many philosophers have turned their attention to biology to assess the adequacy of a philosophy of science that has been drawn from an almost exclusive examination and reconstruction of physics. (Rosenberg [1985: 13]) Nor is it a surprise that, in this century particularly, the philosophy of science has become almost a subdiscipline in itself. But this does not include the philosophy of biology-at least, it did not until very recently. Although the father of philosophy of science, Aristotle, was as much a biologist as a philosopher, the philosophers of science in the twentieth century have focused mainly on the physical sciences, and any spare effort has tended to be directed toward the social sciences. (Ruse [1988: 1-2]) Again, philosophers of biology claimed that philosophy of biology was not part of philosophy of science during its formative years as a discipline. The professionalization of philosophy of biology seems to have been fuelled, in part, by the conviction that philosophy of biology occupied a marginal position within early philosophy of science. But the rhetoric of return, to 3 One finds less justificatory maneuvering in the introductions to philosophy of biology textbooks published after the late 1980s, perhaps because by then the field had attained a certain professional status and the authors felt no need to explicitly argue for the importance of biology in philosophy of science. See, for example, Sober ([1993] ); Rosenberg ([1994] ); Mahner and Bunge ([1997] ); Hull and Ruse ([1998] ); Sterelny and Griffiths ([1999] ). Nevertheless, the received view of the history of philosophy of biology continues to be told-just not in textbooks (see Callebaut [1993] ; Wolters [1999] ).
Mach or even Aristotle, suggests that philosophers of biology felt their marginalized situation was recent. Logical positivism, in particular, was often identified as the culprit. Betty Smocovitis, for example, suggests that contemporary philosophy of biology emerged 'out of the 1960s antireductionist movements in biology and antipositivist movements in philosophy'-while also acknowledging the need for further study (Smocovitis [1996: 105] ).
Consider the following comments from Werner Callebaut, Elliott Sober, and Alexander
Rosenberg:
Sober: The positivists took as one of their main paradigms of a scientific theory Einstein's theory of relativity, and their philosophical problems and the views that they developed about them were often keyed to that single theory. To a lesser degree they considered quantum mechanics. But issues in biology did not interest them very much; specific issues that are internal to psychological theory matter to them almost not at all.
Well, if you look at the Encyclopedia of Unified Science, even back in the thirties and forties there were articles on economics and biology and other disciplines.
Callebaut: But in retrospect we can say it was basically a philosophy of physics (of a rather peculiar kind). The 'application' of logical-empiricist views to, say, biology-I'm thinking of the work of someone like Woodger-now makes us smile-or cry. The thing may have been intended as general theory, but the methodology that was put forward
Rosenberg: was drawn exclusively from physics
Callebaut: and other fields had to fit that model. You agree with that. So a fundamental problem of older work in philosophy of biology was that to the extent it was done by people working in the positivist tradition, like Woodger, they had a very difficult time.
Rosenberg: Yes, absolutely.
Sober: What has happened since the demise of positivism is that philosophers have gotten interested in the details of particular scientific theories. In the 1930s, philosophers of physics were interested in relativity theory and quantum theory and that has continued to the present. Only more recently have philosophers of biology really gotten into the details of evolutionary theory and other theories in biology; and similarly with philosophy of psychology, I think. The demise of positivism allowed this proliferation to occur, because it was no longer necessarily a given that all scientific theories were the same; there could be problems internal to a scientific theory that might be of philosophical interest. (Callebaut [1993: 73-74 
Here, the emergence of philosophy of biology is explicitly tied to the putative fall of logical positivism after the 1950s. And that position, that logical positivism was hostile to philosophy of biology, is well entrenched among contemporary philosophers of biology.
Why might this be? If we consider the history of philosophy of science literature, we find little to refute the received view of the origins of philosophy of biology and its relation to general philosophy of science. Standard historical treatments of logical positivism focus on the roles of physics and the social sciences in the development of philosophy of science (see, for example, Suppe [1977: 3-241] ; Friedman [1999] ). No mention is made of biology in those works, and that lacuna might suggest to some readers that the biological sciences did not contribute to the early development of philosophy of science in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s.
Consider, too, general philosophy of science textbooks and key monographs published before the 1970s (that is, during the 'first wave' of philosophy of biology). Almost all excluded biology in their explications of philosophical issues; a few discussed biology, but only very briefly (see, for example, Bergmann [1957] ; Braithwaite [1953] ; Frank [1949] ; Goodman [1954] ; Hanson [1958] ; Hempel [1965 Hempel [ , 1966 ; Hesse [1966] ; Madden [1960] ; Nagel [1961] ; Pap [1962] ; Popper [1959 Popper [ , 1962 ; Salmon [1967] ; Smart [1968] ; Toulmin [1953]; Wartofsky [1968] ). So the received view, even if inaccurate (as I shall argue), is not altogether implausible.
Despite its apparently widespread acceptance, the received view of the historical origins of philosophy of biology as a subdiscipline of philosophy of science has never been systematically examined. The only historical treatment of philosophy of biology, Grene and and analysis (Giere [1996] ). Future work must flesh out the details and circumscribe the relevance of the evidence I present. But the time is ripe for a broad sketch of important trends.
Methods
To assess the role and influence of philosophy of biology in the early development of philosophy of science I analyzed the contents of the first philosophy of science journals, published between 1930 : Erkenntnis (vol. 1 [1930 -1931 ] to vol. 8 [1939 -1940 BJPS; vol. 1 [1950 -1951 ] to vol. 10 [1959 -1960 computed a linear regression on the data set, which showed no significant change over time (see Fig. 1 ).
Fig. 1: Philosophy of biology articles published per year (as a percentage of total)
These results strongly refute the hypothesis, so integral to the received view, that philosophy of biology was excluded during the formative years of philosophy of science.
Nevertheless, even if one acknowledges that philosophy of biology was not entirely neglected by early philosophers of science, there is a common belief that the kind of work they published was something other than 'real', or legitimate, philosophy of biology. That is, biology was either forced by early philosophers of science into a philosophical framework derived from physics or was run out of the realm of science altogether. Michael Ruse, for example, wrote the following in 1988:
What little attention has been paid to biology [by twentieth-century philosophers of science] has been generally directed to one extreme or another. At one end of the spectrum we have those who were overly impressed by the turn-of-the-century formalisms of the logicians and mathematicians, and who wanted to do likewise for biology. Since they-especially their leader J. H. Woodger-were simultaneously empiricists of the most naively dogmatic kind, their efforts tended to go unread. At the other end of the spectrum we have those who feared and loathed materialism, and who were determined to prove that an understanding of organisms demands reference to vital forces or spirits-élans vitaux or entelechies-forever beyond the grasp of conventional science. (Ruse [1988: 1-2 
])
Having, as we now do, a complete list of biology articles published in philosophy of science journals from 1930-1959, we are well-positioned to assess Ruse's charge. Indeed, we do find several articles that deal with vitalism-mechanism debates, and one or two authors advocated a 'vitalist' position. 9 Moreover, we find several articles in the 'formalist' vein, which attempt to analyze biology along the lines of physics. However, this is not nearly the whole story. Even a cursory glance through the list reveals a large number of articles that any contemporary philosopher of biology would recognize as 'real' philosophy of biology.
Consider the following titles, listed in chronological order:
• Das Biologische Individuum (1930) (1931) • Die Methodologischen Grundlagen der Biologie (1932 Biologie ( -1933 • Kausalität, Biologie und Psychologie ( Philosophy of science journals, therefore, were publishing 'real' philosophy of biology articles-many of them-throughout the 1930s, 40s, and 50s.
To summarize: nearly 10% of the articles published each year in the four professional philosophy of science journals from 1930 to 1959 were in philosophy of biology. Moreover, this rate of publication was steady with no significant change over the course of 30 years (at most, there was a slight tapering off of philosophy of biology articles during the 1950s, but this is not a statistically relevant trend). While a minority of these articles concerned issues that we now consider dated, such as logical axiomatisation and vitalism, nearly half addressed subjects recognizable as topical today. But present relevance is neither here nor there with regard to the fundamental historical point; these data show that throughout the formative period of the professionalization of philosophy of science, philosophy of biology was an active part of the field.
Conclusions
Many have argued that, despite its rhetoric of scientific unity and pluralism, logical positivism in fact neglected the analysis of biology, focusing instead on the hierarchical termini of physics and, to a much lesser extent, the social sciences (see, for example, Wolters Howard [2003] ; Reisch [2005] ). The rise of philosophy of biology as its own subdiscipline during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s may be better explained as a reaction to this displacementand the abstraction away from science that generally occurred during the 1950s and 60s. The return to the science urged by and taken up with a vengeance by philosophers of biology (among many others) in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s gave the burgeoning field its problematic. It represented a broader return to-not a reaction against-the philosophy of science of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s, one in which philosophers and scientists together set the problematic of philosophy of science.
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